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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4037 
___________ 
 
ABDUS SHAHID, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF DARBY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-02772) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. William Ditter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 13, 2014 
Before:  SMITH, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 24, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Abdus Shahid, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order entering 
judgment in favor of the Borough of Darby (the “Borough”).  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 In 2006, Shahid, a United States citizen and native of Bangladesh, bought a non-
residential warehouse located in the Borough.  The warehouse had ten separate rental 
units and was located across the street from a Borough office.  After Shahid purchased 
the warehouse, three different units were occupied at various times and by different 
tenants.  The Borough’s Ordinance No. 118.5 states that “[n]o building may be occupied 
for nonresidential use by a person unless the owner or tenant thereof shall first have 
applied for and received a nonresidential occupancy permit application.”  (Dkt. No. 38, p. 
3.)  Once the application is received, the Borough may issue a nonresidential occupancy 
(“NRO”) certificate.  Shahid allowed several people to conduct business in the warehouse 
without NRO certificates, in violation of the ordinance.   
 In 2008, the Borough (through Joseph Nerelli, its Chief Code Enforcement 
Officer) notified Shahid of safety concerns it had about the warehouse, including 
disassembled vehicles parked on the property, a large silver trailer on the lot that needed 
to be removed, and a company storing plastic food containers at the site.  There were no 
NRO certificates on file authorizing those activities.  From 2008 to 2011, the Borough 
issued the following citations against Shahid in connection with his ownership of the 
warehouse:  five for violating the Borough’s sanitation ordinance; thirteen for violating 
Ordinance No. 118.5 due to a tenant at the warehouse who did not have an NRO 
certificate; one for failing to remove snow; and four for failing to remove trash.  Shahid 
was convicted of violating the Borough’s ordinances, as set forth in the citations.   
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 Shahid then filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming 
that the Borough discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin, 
thereby violating his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Monell v. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978).  He alleged that the Borough’s 
actions were part of a scheme to limit business in the Borough to African-Americans, and 
designed to specifically exclude him because he was from a foreign country.  After 
conducting a bench trial on Shahid’s discrimination claims, the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of the Borough.  Shahid appeals.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Shahid argues that the District 
Court impermissibly based its adverse credibility finding on hearsay evidence and that its 
order was based on incorrect findings of fact.  In response, the Borough argues that the 
District Court properly admitted the evidence and asks that we affirm the District Court’s 
entry of judgment in its favor because Shahid has not met his burden of proving that the 
District Court’s factual determinations were clearly erroneous.   
 Whether testimony is hearsay is a question of law over which we exercise plenary 
review.  United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 538 (3d Cir. 2010).  To the extent the 
District Court’s ruling was based on a permissible interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, we review only for an abuse of discretion.  United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 
210, 220 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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 The District Court stated in its findings of fact that “Shahid’s case is entirely 
dependent on his credibility and I find him not credible.”  (Dkt. No. 38, p. 2.) That 
finding was based on the District Court’s observations of him during trial, his testimony, 
and its “conclusion that the invoice he produced . . . in this case and the invoices he 
produced” in an earlier case were “fraudulent.”  (Id.)  The court in Shahid’s earlier 
discrimination case concluded that he fabricated three invoices.  The Borough offered 
those invoices, along with a nearly identical one that Shahid prepared in this case, as 
evidence of his fraud, not to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.  Fed. R. Evid. 
801(c).  We perceive no error in the District Court’s considering the invoices, along with 
Shahid’s demeanor and testimony, in reaching its conclusion that he was not credible.   
  We review the District Court’s findings of fact for clear error.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
52(a); Newark Branch, NAACP v. City of Bayonne, N.J., 134 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 
1998).  “To the extent that the District Court’s conclusions rested on credibility 
determinations, our review is particularly deferential.”  Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ins. 
Co. of N. Am., 609 F.3d 143, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because credibility determinations 
are “quintessentially the province of the trial court,” we reject them only in “rare 
circumstances.”  Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125, 140 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Such rare circumstances are not present in this case. The District Court concluded 
that there was “no credible evidence” that the Borough discriminated against Shahid and 
that his “allegations of discrimination are not supported by the evidence.”  (Dkt. No. 38, 
p. 6.)   Shahid argues that the District Court’s findings of facts are “not true,” but offers 
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nothing substantive from the record below to support his assertions that the District 
Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations were clearly erroneous.  We must 
therefore defer to the District Court and will not disturb its findings on appeal. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court entered September 
19, 2013, will be affirmed.  
